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Commentary on Discretionary Trusts: An Update
by Richard C. Ausness
Alexander A. Bove, Jr.*
Writing an article on the exercise of a trustee’s discretion takes a
certain amount of courage, and at the very least, it is risky business,
since the very essence of an act of exercising one’s discretion calls for
purely personal evaluations and decisions that are by their very nature
subjective, and often reflect cognitive biases of the trustee. Despite that,
they are presumptively justifiable.1 Add to the mix the so-called standards of behavior by which a trustee is sometimes judged, such as “reasonableness,” “impartiality,” “good faith,” and “loyalty,” which are
themselves vague and dependent on each set of facts, and in a hundred
cases on the “reasonableness” of the exercise of the trustee’s discretion,
for example, we might see a hundred different results, even though the
underlying facts were not that dissimilar. Unfortunately, there is no
Trustee’s Handbook with specific instructions to ensure consistency
from case to case. Thus, the daunting task undertaken by Professor
Richard Ausness in his article, “Discretionary Trusts: An Update,” deserves the attention of practitioners and academics alike to determine
what, if anything, has changed on the subject and whether any new light
or insight is shed on the courts’ attitude towards trustee’s discretion. If
not, does the article nevertheless provide insight into something that is
critical for us practitioners to keep in mind? That is, with limited exception, the broader we draft the provisions for trustee’s discretion, the
more trouble we may be making for the trust and the beneficiaries.
Professor Ausness opens by paying homage to what he rightfully
calls the “seminal” article on trustee’s discretion by Dean Edward
Halbach in the 1961 Columbia Law Review.2 Citing Halbach’s article
was quite appropriate, as it should be mandatory study (not just reading) for every attorney who drafts trusts. One considerable difference
* Alexander Bove is a principal of Bove & Langa, PC, Boston, MA. He is also
Adjunct Professor of Law Emeritus, Boston University Law School Graduate Tax program. He is author of 7 books and over 1,000 articles and is admitted to practice as a
Solicitor in England and Wales. His most recent book is Trust Protectors - A Practice
Manual With Forms, Juris Publishing.
1 See Anderson v. Sams (In re Sams’ Estate), 258 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1935).
2 Richard C. Ausness, Discretionary Trusts: An Update, 43 ACTEC. L.J. 231, 231
(2018) (referencing Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary
Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1961)).
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between Halbach’s work and Prof. Ausness’ article is that Halbach offers an insightful discourse on the several issues involved in the question
of trustee’s discretion, while Prof. Ausness uses a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning by presenting numerous cases covering
each of the relevant issues to illustrate how courts viewed the typical
questions that arose on trustee’s discretion. For example, on the issue of
to what extent a trustee could or should apply its discretion in a “support” trust, Prof. Ausness discusses the facts of several cases where the
courts held an abuse of discretion in some3 and upheld the exercise of
discretion in others,4 leaving the reader to use her own discretion to
decide whether she agreed with the court. Although interesting reading
which could prove beneficial to inexperienced attorneys, I felt that Professor Ausness’ own evaluation in these cases would have been instructional. I would have welcomed his personal observations on a “bad
faith” versus “good faith” exercise by a trustee. For example, in a
“spray” trust where the trustee has the sole discretion to distribute (or
not) among a group of beneficiaries, is it “bad faith” or an abuse of
discretion if the trustee decides to distribute nothing to a particular beneficiary over a period of years? The quick reaction to this is, shouldn’t
the answer depend on whether that beneficiary had his own outside
source of funds? This of course leads in turn to the perennial question of
whether the trustee is “required” to, or “may but need not” consider a
beneficiary’s outside resources. Prof. Ausness mentions this important
issue but not in great detail, perhaps assuming that the several pages
Halbach devoted to it were adequate. Nevertheless, it is an essential
issue often overlooked by draftspersons and would have warranted further discussion.
Professor Ausness’ coverage of the available cases seemed to be
heavily weighted towards “support” trusts, both mandatory and discretionary. Although his discussion of support trusts is articulate and helpful, we were expecting an “update,” and most of the cases cited did not
offer that. In the area of trusts related to support, there have, in fact,
been a number of developments. For example, many families have disabled children for whom they establish “Special Needs Trusts” or “Supplemental Needs Trusts,” and elderly individuals are establishing socalled, “Medicaid Planning Trusts,”5 each of which has been the subject
of numerous developments and commentary over the past 2 or 3 de3 Ausness, supra note 2, at 252-53 (citing In re Trusts for McDonald, 953 N.Y.S.2d
751, 753-54 (App. Div. 2012)).
4 Id. at 247 (citing In re Greenleaf’s Estate, 225 P.2d 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)).
5 See generally THOMAS D. BEGLEY, JR. & ANGELA E. CANELLOS, THE SPECIAL
NEEDS TRUST HANDBOOK (Aspen 2017).
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cades.6 In all of these trusts the trustee is given a certain amount of
discretion, but the breadth of that discretion must be very carefully delineated. This is because even a modicum of “excess” discretion could
cause a total loss of public benefits to the beneficiary, even though the
discretion is or was never exercised. A brief discussion of the precautions would be helpful in this regard, if for no other reason than to provide the reader with the full picture of the discretionary realm of the
trustee and the risks of inattentive drafting.
Speaking further of developments, one of the most significant developments in trust law since Halbach has been the trend and practice
towards trust decanting. Trust decanting is a term of art suggesting that a
trustee with the discretionary authority to do so would transfer some or
all of the assets from the present trust into a new (or different) trust,7
sometimes called the receiving trust. Whether the receiving trust would
have the same or different beneficiaries or the same or different dispositive provisions would in many cases depend on the extent of the trustee’s discretion and the law governing the administration of the trusts.
But the obvious question would be, if an existing beneficiary (of the first
trust) were omitted from the receiving trust, would this be an abuse of
the trustee’s discretion? There have been a number of cases on decanting8 as well as a number of states that have adopted laws permitting
a decanting,9 and the laws of those states vary widely, from allowing the
omission of existing beneficiaries to disallowing such a change,10 although none of those states appears to allow the addition of a new beneficiary to the receiving trust, unless otherwise expressly provided in the
original trust.11 Another area of law importantly connected with trustee’s discretion that Professor Ausness covers clearly is creditor’s rights
to trust assets and the effect of trustee’s discretion on the same, pointing
out that where the discretion exists in a “support” trust, creditors (including the U.S. and state governments where public benefits are provided) who provide necessaries to the beneficiary have greater rights to
recover from the trust.12 We would have further benefited from a discussion of the trend for settlors to establish so-called “Medicaid Planning
6

See id.
UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT § 2(10) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
8 See, e.g., Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 476 Mass. 651 (2017); Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d
1021 (Mass. 2013).
9 See LAW OFFICES OF OSHINS & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 5TH ANNUAL TRUSTS DECANTING STATE RANKING CHART (2018), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b211fb_e22a419
32407481c8d324afe4c6e388a.pdf.
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Harrell v Badger, 171 So. 3d 764, 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). See also
UNIF. TR. DECANTING ACT § 11(C)(1).
12 Ausness, supra note 2, at 274-78.
7
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Trust,” referred to earlier, where a trustee’s discretion to distribute principal may be directed to beneficiaries other than the settlor or her
spouse.13 We would have also benefited if the creditor’s rights discussion
addressed the huge movement over the past 20 years towards self-settled asset protection trusts in the U.S., which occurred three decades
after Halbach’s article.14
For a couple of centuries, the law in the United States prohibited a
person from protecting her assets by establishing a trust for her own
benefit, even though the trust might be irrevocable, fully discretionary,
and beyond the person’s control. In such cases, the law allowed the settlor’s creditors to reach the maximum amount that the trustee had discretion to pay her.15 In 1997, however, Alaska passed the first domestic
asset protection trust statute, followed the same year by Delaware, and
followed through 2017 by fifteen additional states.16 These new statutes
provided that the assets of a trust settled in the particular state, regardless of the settlor’s domicile, would not be reachable by the settlor’s
creditors if the trust met certain criteria, one of them being that any
distributions to the settlor must be at the trustee’s discretion, discretion
being the keystone to the protection offered by the trust. Interestingly,
however, to date all of the reported cases on such self-settled trusts have
dealt with creditors’ rights to the trust and not with a trustee’s alleged
abuse of discretion.17
On the question of abuse of discretion, which is unquestionably the
more common issue where third party trusts are involved and the central issue of both Prof. Ausness’ and Dean Halbach’s articles, there is
one factor, above all others, to which the courts invariably turn to get
the answer – that is, the settlor’s intent. Except for cases where there
has been clear improper motive or willful misconduct, the settlor’s intent has been repeatedly declared by the courts to be the most important
factor in determining whether the trustee’s exercise of discretion was
proper. In Halbach’s article, the one, central point he repeatedly
stressed was not only how critical this is, but more importantly, how
drafters of discretionary trusts have been continuously and notoriously
negligent and lazy in drafting discretionary provisions in a trust.18 In
13

See BEGLEY & CANELLOS, supra note 5.
See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, TR. & EST., Nov.
2010, at 67.
15 Paolozzi v. Comm’r, 23 T.C. 182 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 156(2) (1959) (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
16 TENTH ANNUAL ACTEC COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION
TRUST STATUTES (David G. Shaftel, ed. 2016) http://www.shaftellaw.com/docs/tenth_an
nual_comparison_dapt_statutes_2016.pdf.
17 See, e.g., In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013).
18 See Halbach, supra note 2, at 1457.
14
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Halbach’s own words, “formulation of the donor’s intentions—is apparently one of the most neglected aspects of estate planning.”19 And in
addressing the importance of the donor’s intent in assessing an exercise
of discretion, he says, “no trust involving dispositive discretion in a trustee should be drafted without providing at least a basic answer to this
inevitable question.”20
I actually spoke to Dean Halbach about this important point, and
recently I spoke with Prof. Ausness. Both of them agreed with my suggestion that where the drafter was reluctant to draft a discretionary
power that could cover three or four pages of details, many of which
may not come into play, the settlor should be encouraged to prepare,
perhaps with the assistance of the legal drafter, a non-binding letter of
wishes to be held by the trustee administering the trust. The letter would
contain a fairly detailed statement of the settlor’s intentions insofar as
discretionary distributions were concerned. It would contain examples
of typical “parental” situations and explain what the settlor would decide in that case. Although the trustee would always be left to make the
final decision, such a letter would give the trustee, and in pressing cases,
the court, information and insight of the settlor’s intent that they would
otherwise never have.21
In closing his article, Prof. Ausness offers a few “Suggestions for
Improvement.”22 One in particular which goes to the heart of his article
is a proposal for a single standard of discretion to judge whether a trustee has abused its discretion. It would be applied if the court found that
the trustee acted either “unreasonably” or in “bad faith,”23 sort of a
combination of the standards imposed by the Restatement (reasonableness)24 and the Uniform Trust Code (good faith).25 Seems like a sensible
approach if applied with reasonable discretion.

19

Id. at 1433.
Id. at 1442.
21 See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Letter of Wishes: Can We Influence Discretion in
Discretionary Trusts?, 35 ACTEC J. 38, 43 (2009).
22 Ausness, supra note 2, at 281-82.
23 Id. at 281.
24 Id.
25 Id.
20

